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STRANGULATION OF THE AMERICAN RULE. 

AN OVERVIEW OF PENDING 

CONGRESSIONAL ATTORNEYS' FEES LEGISLATION 

I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the "Amencan Rule of awarding attorneys fees, each 
party must pay hIs or her own litIgatIon expenses. 1 Courts, how­
ever, may exerCIse theIr equitable power and award fees under the 
bad faith,2 common fund3 or common benefit4 exceptIons. In addi­
tIon, fee awards may be granted when there IS statutory authonza­
tIon. 5 
It IS through the latter exceptIon that Congress has attempted 
to restnct the applicatIon of the Amencan Rule." Congress has at­
tempted thIs restnctIon by broadenmg the courts statutory author 
IzatIon to award attorneys fees. There are numerous attorneys fees 
bills pending m Congress. ThIs artIcle proVIdes an overVIew of 
1. The Amencan Rule IS contrasted by the "English Rule whereIn the 
award of attorneys fees IS proVided to successful litigants. See Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv Co. Wilderness Soc y 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("Amencan Rule"); 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. MaIer Brewmg Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) ("Eng­
lish Rule"). 
2. Under the "bad faith exception an award of attorneys fees IS appropnate 
where the nonprevailing party has acted m bad faith, vexatiously wantonly or for 
oppressive reasons. The bad faith doctnne has allowed the award of attorneys fees 
when there was willful disobedience of court order. or when the 
nonprevailing party acted In bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive rea­
sons. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. Wilderness Soc y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 
(1975). 
3. Common fund awards are made where prevailing party preserves or cre­
ates fund for himself or herself as well as for others. The prevailing party may re­
qUIre the beneficlanes of that fund to share In the attorney compensation. See Trus­
tees of the Internal Improvement Fund Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 
4. The common benefit doctnne, also known as the substantial benefit doc­
tnne, IS an expansIOn of the common fund doctnne. Its Justification IS the same as 
the common fund doctnne but its focus IS directed more toward non-monetary bene­
fits. See Mills Electnc Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-96 (1970). 
5. There IS plethora of statutory exceptions to the Amencan Rule. Probably 
the best known IS Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) 
(1976). For an extensive listing of the statutory exceptIons see Cohen, Awards of At­
torneys Fees Agamst the United States: The SovereIgn Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 
W NEW ENG. L. REV 177 184-91 (1979). 
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those bills. 6 The basIs of the overVIew IS the bills referred to the 
House Committee on the J udiclary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
LibertIes and the AdmlnIstratIon of JustIce. Pnmary focus IS on 
Senate bill 265. Thls bill provIdes a model for an m-depth 
discussIOn of the pending leglslatIon as well as a basls by whICh to 
evaluate other attorneys fees bills. In addition, several Senate bills 
whIch are movmg through Congress are reviewed. Finally a listmg 
of all current bills are compiled m the appendix. 
II. BILLS REFERRED TO THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 

A. S 265-"Equal Access to Justtce" 
Senate bill 265,7 as are the other bills discussed m thlS article, 
IS premIsed upon a fundamental philosophIcal concept of the Amer 
Ican JUrIsprudence system. IndiVIduals who are poor must not be 
denIed access to the Judiclal system. The bill IS deSIgned to award 
litigation expenses, m certam CIrcumstances, to certam parties who 
prevail agamst the United States provlded that the government's 
action was not substantlally Justified. The bill would allow recovery 
of attorneys fees m almost all admInIstrative and JudicIal CIvil pro­
ceedings mvolvmg the government. 8 
The title, "Equal Access to Justice Act, clearly enunCiates the 
Act's fundamental purpose. The Act lS deslgned to elimmate 
deferral to unreasonable governmental actIOn because of mordinate 
costs. The Senate IS concerned that certam mdivlduals may not ex­
erCIse theIr legal nghts because they slffiply cannot afford the ex­
pense. In additIOn, there IS the concern that government will effec­
6. The listing contained In thiS article IS current to October 25, 1979. Undoubt­
edly additional legtslation on thiS tOPIC will be submitted pnor to publication of thiS 
article. See note 110 mfra. 
7 S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) was reported to the Senate from the Sen­
ate Committee on the JudiCiary on July 20, 1979. It was called up by unammous 
consent on July 31, 1979. On the same day the Senate conSidered and passed the 
measure by 94-3 vote. Senators Chiles (D., Fla.), Proxmue (D., Wis.) and Roth 
(R., Del.) voted nay Senators Bayh (D., Ind.), Ford (D., Ky.) and Huddleston 
(D., Ky.) did not vote, although the CongressIOnal Record Indicates that were Sena­
tor Bayh present he would have voted yea. 125 CONGo REc. S1O,924 (daily ed. July 
31, 1979). 
8. Civil actlOns sounding In tort are excluded from coverage. S. 265, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(d)(l) (1979). In additlOn, the bill IS Intended to augment not 
supercede eXisting legislation. Id. 
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tuate acqUlescence by economICally brow-beatmg its opponents. 9 
ThIS concern was expressed repeatedly m the legIslatIve debate on 
the bil1. 1o The Senate also concluded that every prevailing litIgant 
agamst the United States asserts a public as well as a pnvate cause 
of action. Thus, as quasI-pnvate attorneys generals, prevailing 
nongovernment litigants should be provIded with litIgation com­
pensatIon. 11 
The bill allows awards of attorneys fees m certam admIlllstra­
tIve12 and JudiCIal proceedings. 13 With regard to agency proceed­
9. "Congress finds that certam mdivlduals may be deterred from seekmg 
revIew of or defending agamst, unreasonable governmental action because of the ex­
posure mvolved. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1979). 
"Congress further finds that because of the greater resources and expertise of the 
Federal Government the standard for an award of fees agamst the United States 
should be different from the standard governmg an award agamst pnvate litigant, 
In certaIn situations. Id. § 2(b). 
"It IS the purpose of thIS Act­
(1) to dimlmsh the deterrent effect of seekmg revIew of, or defending agaInst, 
governmental action by provIding In specified situations an award of attorney fees. 
[d. § 2(c)(I). 
10. The Senators concern over the harshness and potentially arbitrary applica­
tion of bureaucratic regulations and red tape whICh IS directed toward the small 
bUSInessperson was eVIdent throughout the remarks on the bill. Only several exam­
ples need be cited to replicate the tone of the argument. 
If bureaucrats knew that more of theIr actIOns would be subjected to ques­
tIons In court, I believe that the tendency of many bureaucrats to be care­
less, arbitrary, and Irresponsible would cease. S. 265 provIdes the tools that 
are sorelv needed by most Amencans to fight back when unreasonable rules 
and regulations are wrongly enforced. 
Senator Dole (R., Kan.) 125 CONGo REC. S10,915 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
The legIslation would mark the begInmng of new stage. It would mark the 
readjustment of the tensIOn whIch eXIsts between the citizen and the Fed­
eral agencIes whICh govern theIr lives. 
[Wje also woke up to the fact that the average Amencan, the small bUSIness­
man, the average citizen, IS now beSIeged with regulatory bureaucracy, with 
arbitrary deCISIOns, with small fines from the numerous agencIes that are In 
charge of beIng sure that we are healthy and safe, and cannot afford to fight 
theIr own Government. 
Senator Domemcl (R., N.M.) 125 CONGo REC. S1O,916 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
11. Senator DeConcInI (D., Anz.) stated thIS concept dunng the floor debate 
when he observed that the bill recogmzes that those who choose to litigate an Issue 
agamst the Government are not only representing theIr own vested Interests. They 
are also refimng public policy, correctIng errors and helpmg to define the limits 
of Federal authority. In short, these people are servmg public policy and public 
purpose. 125 CONGo REC. S1O,914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
12. The bill specifically excludes admmlstrative adjudicatIOn InvolVIng the es­
tablishment or fiXIng of rate or In cases InvolVIng license grantIng or renewal. S. 
265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a) (1979). 
13. See note 8 supra. 
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mgs,14 litIgatIon expenses may be awarded to a prevailing party If, 
however, the agency determmes that its actIon was substantIally 
Justified" or that specIal cIrcumstances make an award of attor 
neys fees unjust, no award need be made. IS The burden of prov­
mg a substantIally Justified actIon, however, IS placed on the 
agency 16 The agency IS also authonzed to reduce or deny an 
award if the other party engaged m conduct whICh unduly and un­
reasonably protracted" the final resolutIon. 17 A party dissatisfied 
with the agency s determmatIOn may appeal to a federal court. The 
court may deny the petitIon for appeal, m whICh case no further 
appeal IS allowed, or the court may modify the agency s declSlon, 
but only if the agency abused its discretIon. 18 Should an agency or 
a court award fees, the bill calls for the expenditure to be taken 
from the agency s eXIstmg budget. 19 The agency IS not allowed to 
have a separate budgetary item specifically deSIgned to pay ex­
penses mcurred under the Act. 
With regard to JudicIal proceedings,20 a prevailing party many 
CIvil litIgatIon21 brought by or agamst the United States may be 
awarded reasonable attorneys fees. As with the admInIstrative pro­
ceedings, the court may not award fees if it "finds that the positIon 
of the United States was substantially Justified or that speCIal CIr­
cumstances [would] make [the] award unJust."22 The court may 
also deny or reduce the award if the nongovernmental prevailing 
party "unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolutIOn of 
the matter m controversy "23 
The court may award fees for adjudication conducted at the 
admInIstratIve level unless the government's position was substan­
tIally Justified or unless the eXIstence of speCial CIrcumstances 
would make the award unJust. 24 As with the preVIOUS section, an 
agency whIch IS reqUIred to pay a fee award may not have a speCIal 
14. The bill amends 5 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) by adding an additIonal section to it 
covenng the awarding of attorneys fees. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979). 
15. Id. 
16. D. DECONCINI, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE, S. REP No. 253, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 21 (1979). 
17 Id. 
18. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979). It IS assumed that modification of 
an award could be either an Illcrease or decrease. 
19. Id. 
20. The biJIls deSigned to amend 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976). 
21. Cases III tort are not Illcluded. See note 8 supra. 
22. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1979). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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appropnatIon for such an expenditure. The award must be paId out 
of the agency s eXIstIng budget. 25 
The bill bases compensatIon on the prevailing market rate, but 
limits that compensatIon rate to a maxImum of $75 per hour There 
are proVIsIons for a rate mcrease if there IS an mcrease m the cost 
of livmg or a specIal factor necessitatmg such an mcrease. 26 
The bill broadly defines government to mclude the United 
States, or any agency or officIal actmg m hIS or her officIal capac­
ity 27 ThIS factor IS Important when it comes tIme to pay the award 
smce the award will be paId from an agency s budget. 
The bill carnes with it a three-year sunset provlSlon. 28 It does, 
however, allow for the completIon of pending litIgatIon should the 
program not be contmued. 29 The bill also establishes vanous eco­
nomIC utilizatIon parameters. A party eligible for a fee award IS de­
fined as an mdiVIdual who has not accumulated a net worth m ex­
cess of $1 million at the tIme the adjudicatIOn was mitIated or the 
cIvil actIon filed. In addition, any sole owner of an unmcorporated 
busmess or any partnershIp, corporatIon, assocIation or organIZa­
tIon whICh has a net accumulated worth of $5 million at the time 
the adjudicatIon was mitIated or the CIvil actIon was filed IS ex­
cluded from the fee proVIsIon. 30 There IS, however, one exception 
to thIS latter category An agncultural cooperatIve IS consIdered a 
valid party regardless of economIC worth. 31 
25. [d. § l(a). 
26. An agency, by regulation, or court, based on discretion, may mcrease the 
award because of an mcrease m the cost of livmg or the advent of special circum­
stance such as the "limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceeding m­
volved. [d. §§ 3(a), 4(a). As Senator Kennedy (D., Mass.) notes, the mtent of the 
committee was that "the prevailing market rate apply regardless of the attorneys fi­
nanCial arrangement with thelT clients. 125 CONGo REC. SIO,923 (daily ed. July 31, 
1979). 
27 S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1979). 
28. A sunset provIsion reqUires that legislative body affirmatively continue 
the provIsions of bill. OtherWise, the bill' prOVISIOns are termmated on specified 
date. In the case of S. 265, the sunset prOVISIOn terminates the bill' prOVlSlons at the 
conclUSIOn of three years. ThiS sunset provIsion clearly demonstrates the expenmen­
tal nature of the bill. At the conclUSIOn of the three years, Congress has an opportu­
nity to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the bill. If Congress determmes that Imple­
mentation of the sunset proVISIOn comcldes with its legislative mtent, Congress 
could continue the bill' proVISIOns through enactment of new legislation. Cases 
ansmg pnor to the sunset date, but not reachmg final disposition by that date, are 
still covered by the bill until final disposition. See note 16 supra, at 8. 
29. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1979). 
30. Id. §§ 3(a), 4(a). 
31. Id. ThiS exception was not m the ongmal bill whICh came out of 
committee. It was added as an amendment durmg the floor debate. The amendment 
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It is difficult to dispute the philosophical basis of the bill. Yet, 
as with any piece of legislation, numerous concerns have been 
raised. While the bill is directed toward equal access to justice, the 
practical basis of the bill is directed against government intrusion 
and bureaucratic red tape. 32 If the Senate's primary concern was 
total access to equal justice, it should award fees to any 
nongovernmental party engaged in litigation with the govern­
ment. 33 If the bill is actually designed to make "the bureaucracy 
more accountable in the exercise of its powers and more responsive 
to its citizens' needs, "34 then Congress should eliminate the sub­
terfuge of this bill and enact powerful legislation which would re­
sult in the discharge of bureaucrats who have wronged others. 
While the bill purports to authorize fee awards to prevailing 
parties, it limits those awards to actions in which the government 
was not substantially justified. The legislative history, however, in­
dicates that the action must be unreasonable. 35 The substantially 
was sponsored by Senator Hayakawa (R., Cal.). In his proposal he stated: 
The net worth of the cooperative as an entity is not significant for the pur­
pose of the definition. This amendment would remove the net worth test for 
agricultural cooperatives which meet the definition of the Agricultural Mar­
keting Act. [42 U.S.C. § 1141 j(a) (1976)]. In substance, compliance with the 
tests would insure that only legitimate self-help agricultural associations 
formed by the farmers would be entitled to this treatment under the bill. 
125 CONGo REC. SlO,918 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
32. As Senator McClure (R. Idaho) stated: 

[T]he American people are so frustrated with their Government's intrusion 

into every aspect of their lives we in Congress, whose responsibility it is to 

set the policy of this government, must respond.... [R]egulations are too of­

ten subject to arbitrary interpretation and application by Federal functiona­

ries who are now vested with very broad discretionary powers. 

125 CONGo REC. SlO,920 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
33. See Dunlap, Attorneys' Fees Against Government Defendants: Economics 
Requires A New Proposal, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 311 (1979). 
34. Senator DeConcini (D., Ariz.), 125 CONGo REC. SlO,914 (daily ed. July 31, 
1979). 
35. The legislative history is repleat with references to reasonable and unrea­
sonable actions by the government as the basis for the award. 
Senator DeConcini (D., Ariz.): "It is also intended to affirmatively encourage cit­
izens to challenge actions which they believe to be unreasonable or irresponsible." 
125 CONGo REC. SlO,914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
Senator Culver (D., Iowa): "Unless the agency can prove its position was reason­
able, it would have to pay the attorneys fees ...." Id. at SlO,915. 
Statement by Senator Ford (D., Ky.) quoting the Senate Judiciary Committee re­
port: 
"The test of whether or not a Government action is substantially justified is 
essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government can show that its 
case has a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made. 
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justified standard will be ripe for definitional debate and litigation. 
Critics see this as a drawback to the Act. 36 In addition, special cir­
cumstances may excuse the awarding of a fee. The determination of 
such special circumstances will be left to the agency or the courts 
since neither the Act nor the legislative history provides enough 
guidance. The legislative history does state that an award should 
not be made when "equitable considerations dictate"37 or when the 
government is advancing a good faith argument but that an award 
should be made in cases in which there is a "novel extension of the 
law to areas and there is insufficient legal precedent to establish 
the reasonableness of the agency action. "38 
Not only are the standards vague, but also the government has 
the burden of proving that its action was substantially justified, or 
that special circumstances existed. 39 Critics suggest that placing the 
burden on the government will "chill" enforcement of federal laws 
and increase trial time. 4o An alternative measure, proposed by the 
United States Department of Justice, would utilize the standard set 
down by the United States Supreme Court in Christiansburg Gar­
ment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 41 If the 
prevailing party can demonstrate an unreasonable or frivolous ac­
tion on the part of the government, then attorneys' fees would be 
However, where the Government's position is not reasonably based in the 
law or in fact, fees will be awarded." 
Id. at SI0,918. 
Several Senators, however, used the substantially justified phraseology, merely 
replicating the text of the Act. For example, Senator Thurmond (R., S.C.), id. at 
S10,920 and Senator Nelson (D., Wis.), id. at S1O,922. 
36. Letter from John H. F. Shatluck, Director, and Karen Christensen, Legisla­
tive Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, D.C. to Hon. 
Edward M. Kennedy (July 12, 1979) (hereinafter cited as ACLU): 
The standard of "substantially justified" lends it self [sic] to numerous dif­
ferent interpretations. Although the drafters of S. 265 intend the standard to 
cover unreasonable and harassing government action, the standard is danger­
ously vague.... substantial judicial time will be wastefully expended in 
gleaning what Congress intended by this language. If S. 265 is intended to 
apply to only unreasonable or frivolous cases, it should state so explicitly. 
37. Note 16 supra, at 7. 
38. Senator Kennedy (D., Mass.) 125 CONGo REc. S1O,923 (daily ed. July 31, 
1979). 
39. The Report stated "[t]he committee believes that it is far easier for the 
Government, which has control of the evidence, to prove the reasonableness of its 
action than it is for a private party to marshal the facts to prove that the Government 
was unreasonable." Note 16 supra, at 6. 
40. ACLU, supra note 36, at 2. 
41. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
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awarded. 42 The Senate rejected the use of the Christiansburg 
criteria as "inadequate because it simply would not overcome the 
strong disincentives to the exercise of legal rights which now exist 
in litigation with the Government. "43 
An important concern of the critics revolves around the poten­
tial chilling effect the bill may have on the assertive enforcement of 
federal laws. Enforcement may be limited because of the economic 
position in which individual agencies may find themselves. This 
criticism seems to lack the substance found in other expressed con­
cerns. For example, the Justice Department asserts, without 
supportive material, that "the costs of this legislation in terms of 
the deterrent effect on legitimate law enforcement efforts could 
well exceed its cost in dollars and cents."44 Legislative history, 
however, indicates that bureaucratic administrators might become 
more effective if there is a slight chill. 45 
Budgetary considerations are another area of concern. The es­
timated cost of the bill over the experimental three-year period 
will be in excess of $367 million. 46 The legislative history, how­
ever, indicates a concern about the cost of litigation to the 
businessperson, but fails to discuss the cost to the government. 47 
42. The Department of Justice's position and a copy of its proposed bill was 
sent to the House Committee on the Judiciary subsequent to the passage of S. 265 in 
the Senate. Letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General to Peter W. 
Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Octo­
ber 17, 1979) (hereinafter cited as Justice). 
See also ACLU, supra note 36, at 3; Letter from Mark Green, Director, Nancy 
Drabble, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen, Washington D.C. to Judiciary Committee 
Members (July 9, 1979) (hereinafter cited as Public Citizen). 
43. Note 16 supra, at 6. 
44. Justice, supra note 42, at 3. See also ACLU, supra note 36, at 2; Public Citi­
zen, supra note 42, at 2. 
45. Senator Nelson (D., Wis.) seems to believe a slight 'chill' will be invigorat­
ing for the bureaucrat: 
[Wlhere the Government agency goes ahead without a strong case against a 
business; or where it is proceeding carelessly; or where it now imposes a 
fine, secure in the knowledge that its action will not be challenged because 
of the cost involved, I would be very happy if the enactment of this legisla­
tion caused some chilling effect on Government regulatory efforts. 
125 CONGo REC. S1O,922 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
46. Note 16 supra, at 9-12. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost 
at $108 million for 1980, $122 million for 1981, and $137 million for 1982. Id. at 10. 
47. Representative of the comments made during the floor debate are those by 
Senator Dole (R., Kan.), "Ironically, it appears that American justice has become too 
costly for the average American budget," and by Senator Helms (R., N.C.) "Justice 
simply will not be done when one side cannot afford to fight." 125 CONGo REC. 
510,915, 10,922 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
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In fact, it appears that, according to at least one Senator, the fed­
eral government is the ultimate deep pocket. 48 The budgetary as­
pects of S. 265, however, are a major concern of the critics. Funds, 
assert the critics, will be directed away from law enforcement ac­
tivities. 49 In addition, the American Civil Liberties Union con­
tends: 
[T]axpayers will be paying three times for enforcement of federal 
statutes-first for the enforcement activity, second for attorney 
fees where enforcement efforts are unsuccessful, and third 
through an effective subsidy to businesses which are even now 
allowed to deduct costs of litigation, including attorney fees, 
from their income taxes. This price is simply too high to ask the 
taxpayers to pay. 50 
The Department of Justice concurs that the cost of the legislation is 
too high. It states: "[T]he annual cost of S. 265 would likely exceed 
$125 million-an amount equal to 30 percent of the current 
operating budget for the federal courts. "51 
The cost of this bill may have an unfortunate result despite its 
philosophical appeal. Agencies, faced with expending unbudgeted 
monies will either cut back on established programs or inflate fu­
ture budgetary requests. In addition, the government agencies may 
find it more cost efficient to abdicate enforcement of legislatively 
mandated programs or to abdicate asserting the reasonableness of 
their position in order to save money. In some cases, it may cost 
less merely to give up. Such a result would not only be counter to 
the intent of the legislation, but also may unjustly enhance the eco­
nomic position of the prevailing party. 
The final concern of the critics is that the legislation sweeps 
too broadly. It brushes aside the American rule too suddenly. 52 It 
48. Remarks by Senator McClure (R., Idaho): 

State and local government, and therefore taxpayers, normally operate on 

tight budgets, as do labor organizations and business corporations. However, 

the Federal Government is not under similar constraints. Normally, the 

agency or bureau is funded to bring suits, to enforce the laws, to implement 

social policies. The imbalance is clear. 

125 CONGo REc. SIO,921 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
49. ACLU, supra note 36, at 3. 
50. Id. 
51. Justice, supra note 42, at 2. The letter goes on to state that the Congres­
sional Budget Office only estimated direct costs of the legislation and did not in­
clude indirect costs such as government attorney and court personnel time. Id. See 
also ACLU, supra note 36, at 3. 
52. See ACLU, supra note 36, at 1. 
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applies to too many areas, from contract disputes to environmental 
protection enforcement. 53 The Senate does not appear to address 
the issue of impact, except where it focuses on the impact exerted 
on businesspersons. 
The concerns raised by critics, however, do not and should 
not negate the important philosophical intent of the legislation. If 
citizen cynicism of the government and government harassment of 
the citizens are cured by the passage of S. 265, perhaps the effort 
and expense will be worthwhile. 
B. H.R. 2846 a Bill Entitled Equal Access to Justice 
H.R. 2846 is the second in a trilogy of Equal Access to Justice 
bills pending in the House's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties and the Administration of Justice. Its basic structure is 
identical to S. 265. 54 There are, however, notable exceptions. 
While H. R. 2846 limits the parties who may take advantage of the 
fee award,55 it does not include either the sole owner of an 
unincorporated business or an agricultural cooperative. The most 
significant difference between the two bills is that the House bill 
authorizes payment of the fee award to be made by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) instead of the specific agency involved in 
the administrative or judicial controversy. 56 This method of pay­
ment diminishes the 'chilling effect' in enforcement that may occur 
with agencies that are required to pay fee awards directly from 
their budget. 
53. [Tlhe legislation would apply in contract disputes, social security mat­
ters, land condemnation suits, environmental enforcement actions, and al­
most every other type of case that the Government litigates without any 
showing that the availability of a fee-shifting provision is necessary to ena­
ble litigants effectively to vindicate their rights in such cases. 
Justice, supra note 42, at 2. 
54. H.R. 2846 is based upon the same philosophical concept as S. 265. In his 
remarks in the House, Representative Udall (D., Ariz.) stated the premises of the 
bill: 
We all recognize that our society has grown from a simple agrarian cul­
ture.... Accompanying that growth has been an increase in the size of gov­
ernment and in the number of Government rules and regulations. And as 
this regulatory maze increases in complexity the costs of dealing with it and 
with the Government have increases [sicl as well. ... the Equal Access to 
Justice Act insures that when that regulation is onerous, perhaps unjust or 
unnecessary, small firms will be able to go to court for an objective, unbi­
ased hearing. 
125 CONGo REC. H7423-24 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979). 
55. H.R. 2846, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979). 
56. Id. 
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H.R. 2846 contains potentially limiting language when it au­
thorizes fee awards for "agency adjudication." S. 265 uses the 
broader term "proceeding." While both bills are apparently at­
tempting to address the same issue, it would be a broader focus to 
use the term "proceeding." 
Another difference between S. 265 and H.R. 2846 is that the 
latter does not contain a provision dealing with action initiated be­
fore, but not completed by the end of the three-year experimental 
sunset provision. The exclusion of such a provision may protract lit­
igation in hopes that it will result in either default or less than ade­
quate settlement. 
C. H.R. 5342 a Bill Entitled "Equal Access to Justice Act" 
The final Equal Access bill follows S. 265 more closely than 
did H.R. 2846. There are, however, two notable distinctions be­
tween H.R. 5342 and S. 265. First, the maximum allowable attor­
neys' fee rate is $100 per hour57 as compared to $75 per hour con­
tained in S. 265 (and H.R. 2846). Second, and more importantly, 
the standard used to judge the government's action is changed 
from a "substantially justified" basis to a "clearly justified" basis. 58 
Since there is, however, no legislative debate available on the bill, 
it would be inappropriate to speculate whether this standard will 
translate into the "reasonableness" standard that the Senate felt de­
fined the substantially justified standard. 
D. H.R. 302 a Bill to Provide That in Civil Actions Where the 
United States Is Plaintiff, a Prevailing Defendant May Recover a 
Reasonable Attorney's Fee and Other Reasonable Litigation Costs 
This bill59 is simplistic in form and approach. In any civil ac­
tion, a prevailing nongovernmental party is to be awarded reasona­
ble attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The bill's lack of compre­
hensiveness leaves numerous questions unanswered. From whose 
budget is the prevailing party paid? Does United States terminol­
ogy include agencies and officials acting in their official capacity? 
Does the term civil action exclude administrative proceedings? 
The indefiniteness of the bill, however, does not detract from 
its philosophically appealing aspect. Defendants, regardless of 
57. H.R. 5342, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979). 
58. Id. § 4(a). 
59. H.R. 302 is identical to several other bills introduced in the House during 
the 96th Congress: H.R. 436, 670, 1365, 1384, 2371, 3513. 
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wealth, may obtain reasonable fee awards provided that they pre­
vail against the government. 
E. H.R. 3516 a Bill to Provide for the Recovery by the Prevailing 
Party of Attorneys' Fees from the United States in Civil Actions 
Where the United States Is a Party Which Does Not Prevail 
This bill, while similar in approach to H.R. 302, broadens the 
scope of the award by including an award for prevailing in a civil 
action regardless of whether the nongovernmental party is a plain­
tiff or a defendant. As with the previous bill, however, the concep­
tual framework of the bill leaves many important questions 
unanswered. 
F. H.R. 3517 a Bill to Authorize the Payment of Attorneys' Fees 
in Tax Cases 
Cited as the "Taxpayer's Attorney Fee Award Act of 1979," 
the bill authorizes the awarding of reasonable attorneys' fees to 
nongovernmental prevailing parties where tax liability is an issue. 
A prevailing party apparently may be either a plaintiff or defend­
ant. 60 
C. H.R. 5467 a Bill to Amend Title 35, United States Code to 
Provide That, Except in Exceptional Cases, Attorneys' Fees Should 
Be Awarded in Cases InvolVing Patent Infringements 
The substantive portion of the bill amends section 285,61 by 
inserting in lieu of the existing phraseology the sentence: "The 
court, except in exceptional cases, may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party." This bill demonstrates the broad and 
sweeping desire by members of Congress to limit the application of 
the American rule. 
H. H.R. 5009 a Bill to Provide That Attorneys' Fees And Other 
Reasonable Costs Shall Be Reimbursed to Taxpayers Who Substan­
tially Prevail in Any Proceeding, Litigation, or Court Action Which 
Is Brought By or Against the United States for the Determination, 
Collection or Refund of any Tax, Interest, Penalty, or Other Mat­
ter Arising Under the Internal Revenue Code 
60. See notes 73-90 infra and accompanying text (discussion of 5.1444, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (a more comprehensive tax hill)). 
61. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976) currently reads: "The court in exceptional cases may 
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." ld. 
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This bill is a variation of S. 265. Its focus is limited to tax is­
sues. While the bill is entitled "Taxpayers' Litigation and Equity 
Award Act of 1979," its purpose is identical to that of S. 265. In 
this case, the economic disparity between government and individ­
uals may deter the individuals or organizations from seeking reve­
nue or defending against governmental action. 62 Thus, the purpose 
of the Act is to diminish the deterrent effect of such disparity by 
providing, in specified situations, the litigation costs involved in as­
serting a position against the government. 
In order to accomplish its objective, the bill provides for the 
awarding to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party of rea­
sonable attorneys' fees in any proceeding, litigation or court action 
arising under the Internal Revenue Code. 63 If the government 
withdraws from the action, a party is considered to have substan­
tially prevailed. 64 
The bill provides a different method of determining the limita­
tion of the award than has been found in previous bills. Reasonable 
award costs may not exceed $20,000. In addition, however, there is 
an alternative computation method. It provides that the reasonable 
cost, if greater than $20,000, may not exceed the monies expended 
by or allocated to the United States. There is a limitation on who 
may use this latter fee award formula. A party, such as an individ­
ual, a partnership, a corporation, an association or organization, 
must have net assets less than $1 million at the time the action was 
commenced, in order to take advantage of the second fee award 
formula. Reasonable attorney rates will be based upon the prevail­
ing market rate. 65 
The bill defines "United States" broadly to include any agency 
and officials acting in their official capacity.66 In other bills where 
the term "United States" has been broadly defined, the expendi­
ture for the award comes from the agency's budget. This approach 
is only partly true in this bill. The bill calls for the expenditure to 
be made through the GAO "unless the basis for an award is a find­
ing that the United States acted in bad faith or unreasonably in 
which case the award shall be paid by the Internal Revenue Serv­
ice out of its appropriation. "67 
62. H.R. 5009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979). 
63. ld. § 3(a). 
64. Id. 
65. ld. § 3(b)(c). 
66. ld. § 3(c)(1)(ii). 
67. ld. § 3(F). 
334 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:321 
Because of the bill's language, it would appear that the termi­
nology "through the General Accounting Office" means that the 
GAO does not serve as a conduit for the monies awarded, but is 
the paying agent in all cases except where the agency's position 
was unreasonable or in bad faith. If the latter circumstances 
occurred, the agency would pay the award. The bill does not indi­
cate whether the agency may set up a separate budgetary item to 
cover a potential fee award. 
H.R. 5009 is broader in scope than S. 265 in that it does not 
require unreasonable governmental action as a condition to an 
award. The chilling effect on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
however, may be the same as the chilling effect on agencies cov­
ered under S. 265, if it must pay the award because of an unrea­
sonable position. 68 
This bill, unlike S. 265, does not state where the burden of 
proof is placed in order to determine the unreasonableness or bad 
faith action of the agency. The distinction does not affect the pre­
vailing party as much as it will affect the IRS and the GAO. Pre­
sumably, both would prefer the other to pay. It would be ironic if 
one of the agencies had to litigate the question of reasonableness of 
action in order to determine which agency paid the prevailing 
party. 
The award may be appealed to a federal court. If it is, the 
court may reduce, deny or increase the award. An increase in 
award may be implemented by the court when the United States 
engages in actions which serve to unduly and unreasonably protract 
the final resolution of the issue, or where special circumstances 
make the award unjust. Likewise, a reduction or denial of the 
award to the prevailing party may be made for the same reasons. 69 
Many of the concerns expressed about S. 265 are not present 
in H.R. 5009. For example, the prevailing party will recover 
merely by prevailing unless the award is unjust. In the latter in­
stance, the burden of proof required to deny or reduce the award 
would appear to be on the agency. The chilling effect on the IRS 
is, compared to S. 265, potentially diminished, although not elimi­
nated because the party will recover regardless of the reasonable­
ness of the agency's action. 70 
68. See notes 7-53 supra and accompanying text (discussing S. 265, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979)). 
69. H.R. 5009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1979). 
70. S. 1444 is more likely to get favorable treatment than H.R. 5009. See notes 
73-90 infra and accompanying text (discussing S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)). 
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I. H.R. 1780 a Bill to Provide for the Recovery By a Prevailing 
Defendant in Federal Criminal Cases of a Reasonable Attorney's 
Fee and Other Reasonable Litigation Costs 
H. R. 1780 is designed to accomplish in criminal law what pre­
vious bills have been designed to accomplish in civil and adminis­
trative law, the awarding of fees to prevailing parties. Payment is 
made to any defendant in a federal criminal case "who is not con­
victed after trial, whose prosecution is dismissed with prejudice, or 
whose conviction is ultimately vitiated (unless such conviction is vi­
tiated by pardon on grounds other than innocence) .... "71 
The purpose of this bill is apparently the same as the other 
bills discussed. It, like others,72 suffers from lack of elaboration. 
The bill's specifics must await committee hearings and floor debate. 
III. BILLS WHICH ApPEAR TO BE MOVING 
A. S. 1444 a Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
and Title 28 of the United States Code to Provide for the Award of 
Reasonable Court Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees, to Prevailing 
Parties in Civil Tax Actions, and for Other Purposes 
S. 1444 may be viewed as a complement to S. 265. Its title, 
the "Taxpayer Protection and Reimbursement Act," is certainly not 
as philosophically oriented as S. 265. While the basis of the bill, 
however, is similar,73 there are several significant differences be­
tween them. The focus of S. 1444 is narrow, applying to cases 
brought under the Internal Revenue Code. 74 Despite the narrower 
71. H.R. 1780, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
72. H.R. 302, 3516, 3517, 5407, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
73. The same philosophical purpose is to be found in the two bills. During his 
introduction of S. 1444 Senator Baucus (D., Mont.) stated: 
While recognizing that IRS generally exercises its authority justly and 
with restraint, the fact remains that in an organization as large and complex 
as IRS, which must administer a myriad of complicated tax laws, errors are 
bound to occur. There are instances where IRS has acted arbitrarily, where 
certain taxpayers may feel subjected to IRS harassment or abuse.... Such 
taxpayers, who have to endure the turmoils of litigation through no fault of 
their own, must still pay the legal expenses incurred in the course of court 
action.... In such circumstances, the expense of litigation often makes a 
court victory meaningless for taxpayers. 
125 CONGo REc. S8,712 (daily ed. June 27, 1979). 
74. During the legislative debate on S. 265, the discussion focused, for a short 
while on S. 1444. Senator Baucus (D., Mont.) proposed an amendment which would 
limit the affect of S. 265 or the internal revenue laws for six months after the enact­
ment of S. 265. This amendment was adopted and became § 7(b) of S. 265. 
Since there are differences in the two bills, and S. 265 would only apply to areas 
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focus of the bill, S. 1444 is attempting to broaden existing fee re­
covery legislation. Currently, nongovernmental prevailing parties 
may recover attorneys' fees when they are involved in a civil action 
or proceeding involving the Internal Revenue Code. The authority 
for this is from the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 
1976. 75 As noted in the legislative history of S. 1444, there are lim­
itations to the current award availability. First, courts have limited 
recovery to prevailing defendants. 76 Second, courts have allowed 
awards only where the government has "acted in bad faith, for pur­
poses of harassment or vexatiously or frivolously. "77 
In its attempt to broaden current legislation, the bill incorpo­
rates many of the same provisions as can be found in S. 265, as 
well as some different provisions. For instance, the bill specifies a 
maximum $20,000 reasonable award limitation for anyone civil ac­
tion or proceeding. 78 In addition to attorneys, any individual au­
thorized to practice before the tax court may be awarded fees. 79 
In order to be eligible for an award, the nongovernmental 
party must prevail. Prevailing entails meeting two conditions. 
First, the bill requires that the party "is sustained (whether by ju­
dicial determination or agreement of the parties) as to all, or all but 
an insignificant portion, of the amount in controversy, or ... if no 
amount is in controversy, . . . as to all, or all but an insignificant 
portion, of the issue or issues presented...."80 Second, the pre-
not previously covered by fee award legislation, Senator Baucus implied that the six 
month delay would allow enough time for him to assure passage of S. 1444. As the 
Senator stated, .. lilt is also my understanding that if S. 265 is enacted, that the provi­
sions of S. 1444 will supersede the provisions of S. 265 inasmuch as S. 265 states that 
all speci.fic attorneys' fees provisions will supersede the general provisions contained 
in this bill." 125 CONGo REC. SlO,919 (daily ed. July 31, 1979). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
76. 	 Remarks of Senator Baucus (D., Mont.): 
First of all, courts have been in virtual agreement that reimbursement 
for attorneys' fees may only be made where the taxpayer is the defendant.... 
Second, courts have held that even if the taxpayer is the defendant in a 
civil tax litigation and prevails against the Government, that taxpayer never­
theless may recover attorney's fees from the Government only if the Govern­
ment acted in bad faith, for purposes of harassment or vexatiously or frivo­
lously. Few taxpayers are able to meet such a highly restrictive burden of 
proof, even though they prevail in the litigation. 
125 CONGo REC. S8,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979). 
77. [d. It should be noted that the defendant has the burden of proving that the 
government acted vexatiously, frivolously or in bad faith, for purposes of harassment. 
78. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 101(a), 201 (1979). 
79. [d. § 101(a). Section 201 of the bill (applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)) 
does not contain this wording. 
80. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(a), 201 (1979). 
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vailing party must establish that the position of the United States 
was unreasonable. 81 Reimbursement is thus available to both 
nongovernmental plaintiffs and defendants in most civil actions and 
proceedings under the Internal Revenue Code. 82 
There appears to be a third hurdle for the prevailing party to 
overcome. While the terminology of the Act, buttressed by legisla­
tive history, indicates an award may be made for prevailing at the 
administrative level,83 it appears that the prevailing party must go 
to court in order to prove that the position of the agency was un­
reasonable, and thus be eligible for the award. There is no provi­
sion for the agency to make the award. While the sponsor's intent 
to "encourage the parties to settle thereby lessening court conges­
tion"84 may be a laudable idea, the provisions of the bill do not 
accommodate it. 
Payment of the award is to be made from the general appro­
priations of the agency involved. 85 The granting or denial of the 
award, however, may be appealed. 86 
The bill carries with it a sunset provision,87 but has an ex­
tended retroactive implementation date. Its provisions apply to 
civil tax actions or proceedings instituted after December 31, 1978, 
and before January 1, 1983. 88 
Although S. 1444 is closely related to S. 265, there are differ­
ences between the bills. Several of the concerns expressed about 
S. 265 are eliminated by S. 1444. In particular, the chilling effect 
on the agency is diminished partly because of the burden of prov­
ing unreasonable action by the government lies with the prevailing 
nongovernmental party. The bill is not breaking new ground as 
81. [d. 
82. The bill does limit the award by excluding certain civil actions and pro­
ceedings. These relate to various actions for declaratory judgment. See S. 1444, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1979). 
83. The Act calls for an award in the case of any civil action or proceeding. [d. 
Senator Baucus remarked during the introduction of the bill, "Furthermore, the rule 
that a party can be sustained either by judicial determination or settlement of the 
parties encourage the parties to settle thereby lessening court congestion." 125 
CONGo REC. S8,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979). A broad and appropriate reading of 
these words indicates that resolution of the issue at the administrative level would 
lead to the award of reasonable fees. 
84. 125 CONGo REC. S8,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979). 
85. This would most likely be either the Internal Revenue Service or the Just­
ice Department. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1979). 
86. [d. . 
87. See note 28 supra. 
88. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103,203 (1979). 
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much as it is expanding old ground. It is merely extending the def­
inition of "prevailing party" from that found in the Civil Rights At­
torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 to include nongovernmental 
plaintiffs as well as defendants. This expanded definition may cost 
the taxpayers, as a whole, more money. 89 
The bill's sponsor claims that the bill "provides needed protec­
tion and assistance to those parties who become embroiled in court 
disputes with [the] IRS through no fault of their own, but does not 
penalize [the] IRS for fair, responsible, and reasonable perfor­
mance of its duties. "90 Time, congressional debate and possible im­
plementation will determine if such an objective can be achieved. 
B. S. 1385 a Bill to Amend Title 28 of the United States Code to 
Provide for the Payment of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Other 
Costs in Certain Civil Actions 
S. 1385 is another hybrid of S. 265. It has distinguishing char­
acteristics. An attorney's fee award may be given to a nongovern­
mental prevailing party who is a defendant in an action brought by 
the government and to a nongovernmental prevailing plaintiff who 
brings an action against the government "in connection with the 
collection or recovery of any internal revenue tax or of any penalty 
or other sum under the internal revenue laws. "91 
The bill's intent is to expand the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act of 1976 by removing the "bad faith" burden of proof 
required to be shown by nongovernmental prevailing defendants 
and by allowing plaintiffs in IRS cases to be awarded fees. The em­
phasis is on prevailing, not prevailing against an "unreasonable" 
position. 
Party is defined as "any individual who had at the time the 
civil action was filed, net assets less than ... [$1 million] and any 
partnership, corporation, association, or organization that em­
ployed, at the time the civil action was filed, not more than one 
hundred persons. "92 This definition seemingly leaves a large area 
for a party to maneuver. A partnership of two persons with assets 
in excess of $1 million could be awarded the fee. If the partnership 
had assets in excess of $50 million, there would be an apparent in­
consistency between the intent of the limitation and its practical 
89. Since S. 1444 has not reached the same stage as 5. 265, no Congressional 
Budget Office Cost Estimate is available. 
90. 125 CONGo REC. 58,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979). 
91. S. 1385, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
92. Id. 
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application. There is no limit, other than reasonableness, on the fee 
award, although the rate is calculated on the prevailing market 
rate. 93 
The bill broadly defines "United States" to include any agency 
and official acting in his or her official capacity.94 In so doing, the 
bill is consistent with most other bills because it calls for any award 
to be paid from the losing agency's existing budget. No special allo­
cations are allowed. 95 
C. S. 330 a Bill to Amend Title 38, United States Code, to Estab­
lish Certain Procedures for the Adjudication of Claims for Benefits 
Under Laws Administered by the Veterans' Administration; to Ap­
ply the Provisions of Section 553 of Title 5, United States Code, to 
Rulemaking Procedures of the Veteran's Administration; to Provide 
for Judicial Review of Certain Final Decisions of the Administrator 
of Veteran's Affairs; to Provide for the Payment of Attorneys' Fees 
S. 330, the "Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure 
and Judicial Review Act," is a comprehensive bill covering areas in 
addition to the awarding of attorneys' fees. 96 This overview, how­
ever, will focus on the attorneys' fees provision. 
The bill allows the Veterans' Administration (VA) to award rea­
sonable attorneys' fees for services before that agency for claims 
made in connection with VA related laws. The bill, however, has a 
unique method of determining compensation levels. It does not al­
Iowa fee award in excess of $10 if the claim is resolved prior to the 




96. The bill has four major sections designed to provide for judicial review of 
Veteran Administration (VA) decisions (title III) and the payment of attorneys' fees 
(title IV). In addition, the bill requires that the VA complies with the Administrative 
Procedures Act (title II) and clarify and codify existing adjudicatory procedures 
(title I). 
97. The legislative history is illuminating on this particular point. Senator 
Cranston (D., Cal.), provides an in depth review of the background of title IV regard­
ing attorneys' fees. It appears that the internal claim procedures of the Veterans Ad­
ministration do not require the claimant to have the services of a lawyer during the 
initial stages of processing a claim. Once a claim is filed, the VA performs most of 
the background investigation work and makes a determination. If the claimant dis­
agrees with the finding, the claimant need only file a notice of disagreement in order 
to obtain a review. Should this second review not be to the satisfaction of the claim­
ant, the VA will prepare and send to the claimant a statement of the case. This state­
ment contains: (A) a summary of the evidence on the issues in disagreement; (B) a 
citation of the legal basis for the determination and (C) a decision of the issues in 
controversy. 
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the receipt of a statement of the case, the administrator may ap­
prove an award not in excess of the lesser of the fee agreed be­
tween the attorney and the claimant or $500. 98 If, however, no fee 
is payable unless the attorney prevails, the award is limited to "25 
percent of the total amount of any past-due benefits awarded on 
the basis of the claim. "99 If the claimant is not satisfied with the re­
sult of the VA proceedings, there may be an appeal to the United 
States District Court. lOO A prevailing claimant is entitled to reason­
able attorneys' fees or, if a contingent fee arrangement was en­
tered, an amount not to exceed 25 percent of the total due. lOl If 
the claimant does not prevail, attorneys' fees may still be awarded 
by the court "taking into consideration the extent to which there 
could have appeared to have been a reasonable probability of suc­
cess for such an action at the time it was filed. . . . "102 The maxi­
mum allowable recovery available to the nonprevailing attorney is 
$750. 103 The attorney's fee provision allowed by this bill results in 
an assessment against the veteran's claim and not against the Vet­
erans' Administration. l04 In addition, a prevailing party is broadly 
defined to include a claimant who is granted "all or any part of the 
relief sought. "105 If the attorney questions the award of the fees, 
that issue may be appealed, but only to determine if the Adminis­
trator's action was an abuse of discretion. 106 
It is interesting to note that the ten dollar fee had historical precedent dating 
back to the Civil War and World War I. It seemed to Congress that "lawyers of that 
day were unscrupulous and were taking unfair advantage of veterans by retaining an 
unwarranted portion of the veterans' statutory entitlement in return for very limited 
legal assistance." 125 CONGo REC. S12,712 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979). 
98. S. 330, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1979). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. §§ 4025-29. 
101. Id. § 401. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. The legislative history of this Act places a limitation on the courts in 
the awarding of this fee. "[Tlhe $750 fee allowable under this section is not to be re­
garded as the amount to be approved automatically but rather that the court should 
act so as to discourage attorney representation in cases lacking in any significant 
merit by approving fee amounts at lower levels when appropriate." 125 CONGo REC. 
S12,713 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979). 
104. The Congressional Budget Office produced a cost estimate of S. 330. It 
concluded that enactment of the attorneys' fee title would entail no cost. Obviously, 
this is because neither the VA nor the United States is required, as with other bills, 
to pay for attorneys' fees. 
105. S. 330, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1979). 
106. Id. The "abuse of discretion" standard was placed in the bill because the 
standard "would serve to discourage frivolous challenges to a fee approval or chal­
lenges in arguable cases in which there may be disagreement but the Administrator's 
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s. 330 is a unique attorneys' fees bill. It is not designed to 
provide the "equal access to justice" that the previously discussed 
bills provide. Perhaps this is because, and the legislative history 
bears this out, the role of the VA is viewed by Congress as assist­
ance oriented rather than advocacy oriented. 107 The major congres­
sional concern over this bill appears to be the judicial review 
issue. lOS 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Alexis de Tocqueville asserted that in a democracy, "Govern­
ment is not a benefit, but a necessary evil. "109 Congress is appar­
ently attempting to minimize the effects of this evil by the force of 
economics. Attorneys' fees legislation is an attempt at curtailing the 
bureaucratic giant that Congress has helped to create while at the 
same time providing an economic and philosophical incentive to 
the American people to stand up and fight. In so doing, Congress 
is sounding the death knoll of the "American Rule." Two hundred 
years of common law is being strangled by the potential enactment 
of attorneys' fees legislation. The merits of such a move will be left 
to others to discuss. 
Leslie A. Williamson, Jr. 
judgment is clearly not without reasonable foundation." 125 CONGo REC. SI2,713 
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979). 
107. See, e.g., 125 CONGo REC. S12,721 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979). 
108. [d. (remarks of Senator Humphrey (R., N.H.)). 




ATTORNEYS' FEES BILLS INTRODUCED DURING THE 96TH CONGRESS 

AS OF OCTOBER 25, 1979110 

H. 	R. 162-A bill to provide for judicial review of administrative determi­
nations made by the Board of Veterans Appeals. 
H. R. 204-A bill to provide for the safeguarding of taxpayer rights. 
H. 	 R. 25~A bill to amend chapters 5 and 7 of title 5, United States 
Code, to require formal rulemaking procedures in the establishment of 
grant, loan, benefit, and contract practices, to authorize payment of ex­
penses to certain participants in administrative proceedings, to waive 
sovereign immunity where judicial relief other than money damages is 
sought, and to require the establishment of enforcement procedures for 
grant-in-aid programs. 
H. 	 R. 28~A bill to amend chapters 5 and 7 of title 5 of the United 
States Code to provide for the award of reasonable attorney fees, expert 
witness expenses, and other costs reasonably incurred in proceedings 
before federal agencies. 
H. 	R. 436-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United States 
is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee and other reasonable litigation costs. 
H. 	R. 66~A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 to provide that any employer who successfully contests a citation 
or penalty shall be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other rea­
sonable litigation costs. 
H. 	R. 670--A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United States 
is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee and other reasonable litigation costs. 
H. 	R. 687-A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide 
that attorney's fees allowed in administrative or judicial proceedings un­
der that title (or under title XVIII of such act), in cases where the 
claimants are successful, shall be paid by the Secretary of Health, Edu­
cation, and Welfare rather than deducted from the amounts awarded 
claimants. 
H. 	R. 966-A bill to amend title XVI of the Social Security Act to pro­
vide that attorneys' fees allowed in administrative or judicial proceed­
ings under such title, in cases where the claimants are successful, shall 
be paid by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
H. 	R. 1005-A bill to amend the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commis­
sion Improvement Act to extend the protections contained in such Act 
to owners of new passenger motor vehicles. 
110. The following bills have been introduced into Congress since October 25, 
1979: S. 751; S. 1991; H.R. 5200; H.R. 5337; H.R. 5837; H.R. 5843. 
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H. 	R. 1023-A bill to amend the Miller Act to authorize the payment of 
attorney fees and litigation cost to a prevailing plaintiff from perform­
ance bonds furnished by federal contractors. 
H. R. 1064-A bill to provide for the safeguarding of taxpayer rights. 
H. 	 R. 1365-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United 
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at­
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs. 
H. 	R. 1378-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 to provide that any employer who successfully contests a citation 
or penalty shall be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other rea­
sonable litigation costs. 
H. 	 R. 1384-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United 
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at­
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs. 
H. 	R. 1503--A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to allow 
judicial review of decisions made by the Administrator of the Veterans' 
Administration. 
H. 	R. 1813--A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to establish a 
Court of Veterans' Appeals and to prescribe its jurisdiction and func­
tions. 
H. 	R. 1838-A bill to provide for judicial review of administrative deter­
minations made by the Board of Veterans Appeals. 
H. 	 R. 2170-A bill to provide for the reimbursement of legal expenses 
incurred by the City of Fairfax with respect to a 1971 entry and search 
by employees of the Federal Government. 
H. 	R. 2361-A bill to amend the Act entitled An Act to provide for the 
termination of federal supervision over the property of the Klamath 
Tribe of Indians located in the State of Oregon and the individual 
members thereof, and for other purposes, approved August 13, 1954 
(25 U.S.C. 564w-2) to provide for federal reimbursement to such tribe 
of reasonable litigation expenses incurred by such tribe. 
H. 	 R. 2371-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United 
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at­
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs. 
H. 	R. 2596-A bill to amend chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code 
(commonly known as the Administrative Procedure Act), to permit 
awards of reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses for public par­
ticipation, in federal agency proceedings, (and for other purposes). 
H. 	R. 2659--A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to pro­
vide for an exclusive remedy against the United States in suits based 
upon acts or omissions of the U.S. employees, to provide a remedy 
against the United States with respect to constitutional torts, to estab­
lish procedures whereby a person injured by a constitutional tort may 
initiate and participate in a disciplinary inquiry with respect to such 
tort. 
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H. 	R. 3389-A bill to amend chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, 
to permit the unrestricted assignment of a beneficiary's interest in the 
proceeds of a Government Life Insurance policy in cases involving con­
tested claims, and to increase the amount an attorney may receive for 
representing a claimant in such cases; to authorize the Administrator to 
establish a program of dividends for certain types of National Service 
Life Insurance. 
H. 	 R. 3424--A bill to deter the charging of replacement and non­
replacement fees by blood banks. 
H. 	R. 3466-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 to provide that any employer who successfully contests a citation 
or penalty shall be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other rea­
sonable litigations costs. 
H. 	R. 3515-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United 
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at­
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs. 
H. R. 3814--A bill to amend the Act of December 22, 1974. 
H. 	R. 3866-A bill to provide for the distribution of certain funds appro­
priated to pay judgments in favor of the Delaware Tribe of Indians and 
the Absentee Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma in Indian Claims 
Commission dockets 27-A and 241, 289, and 27-B and 338. 
H. 	R. 3884--A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to pro­
vide for payment by the Government of all reasonable litigation ex­
penses to prevailing taxpayers in legal action. 
H. 	R. 3929-A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to require that 
the United States reimburse defendants for the costs incurred in the 
defense against any civil action filed by the United States on behalf of 
any Indian or Indian tribe. 
H. 	R. 4047-A bill to clarify the standards pertaining to unreasonable at­
torney delay and to expand the sanctions for such conduct. 
H. R. 4257-A bill to help states assist the innocent victims of crime. 
H. 	R. 4297-A bill to amend section 1875 of title 28, United States Code, 
with respect to the appointment and compensation of counsel for a ju­
ror claiming a violation by his employer of rights guaranteed by such 
section. . 
H. 	R. 4321-A bill to amend the Social Security Act to reform the pro­
gram of aid to families with dependent children, to make improvements 
in the standards for eligibility and benefits in the program of supple­
mental security income and to proVide for the improved administration 
of both programs, to make related amendments to the Internal Reve­
nue Code of 1954. 
H. 	R. 4584--A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to au­
thorize the payment of attorneys' fees to taxpayers who prevail in tax 
litigation. 
H. 	R. 4674--A bill to promote the foreign policy of the United States by 
strengthening and improving the Foreign Service of the United States. 
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H. 	R. 476~A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to make 
the United States liable for damages, arising from certain nuclear tests 
at the Nevada Test Site, to individuals residing for a year in the af­
fected area and having cancer, to individuals present at the site during 
a test, and to certain sheep herds. 
H. 	R. 4827-A bill to prohibit the appropriation or use of funds for the 
compensation of attorneys, witnesses, or experts for intervening or 
participating in any rulemaking proceeding of any Federal agency un­
less such appropriation is specifically authorized by law. 
H. 	R. 4927-A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to establish a 
Court of Veterans' Appeals and to prescribe its jurisdiction and func­
tions. 
H. 	R. 5008-A bill to provide for judicial review of administrative deter­
minations made by the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration; 
to apply the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, to 
the rules, regulations, and orders of the Veterans' Administration; to 
provide for the use of a reasonable fee for attorneys in rendering legal 
assistance to veterans with claims beforct the Veterans' Administration. 
H. R. 5087-A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
H. 	R. 5103-A bill to provide for better access to the Federal courts for 
small businesses and others with small to moderate size claims, to ex­
pand the duties of the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Admin­
istration. 
H. 	 R. 5262--A bill to amend the Act of December 22, 1974 (88 Stat. 
1712; 25 U. S.C. 640d). 
S. 	 Res. 9~A resolution authorizing payment out of the contingent fund 
of the Senate of expenses incurred by Senator Morgan in supporting a 
motion to quash certain subpoenas served in the case of Zenith Radio 
Corporation against Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Limited. 
S. 	 209--A bill to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for the purposes of sim­
plifYing, clarifYing, and improving federal law relating to the regulation 
of employee benefit plans, and to foster the establishment and mainte­
nance of plans. 
S. 	 251-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
to insure equal protection of the laws for small business and to provide 
that any employer who successfully contests a citation or penalty shall 
be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other reasonable litigation 
costs. 
S. 	 270-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
to insure equal protection of the laws for small business and to provide 
that any employer who successfully contests a citation or penalty shall 
be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other reasonable litigation 
costs. 
S. 	 300-A bill to restore fair and effective enforcement of the antitrust 
laws. 
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S. 	326-A bill entitled the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act. 
S. 	695-A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to provide for 
an exclusive remedy against the United States in actions based upon 
acts or omissions of United States employees, and to amend title 5 of 
the United States Code to permit a person injured by a constitutional 
tort to initiate and participate in a disciplinary inquiry of the offending 
act or omission. 
S. 	 754--A bill to amend chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, to 
permit the unrestricted assignment of a beneficiary's interest in the 
proceeds of a Government Life Insurance policy in cases involving con­
tested claims, and to increase the amount an attorney may receive for 
representing a claimant in such cases; to authorize the Administrator to 
establish a program of dividends for certain types of National Service 
Life Insurance; to authorize the Administrator to use a flexible interest 
rate in cases where the beneficiary of Government Life Insurance re­
ceives the proceeds of such insurance under certain settlement options. 
S. 	955-A bill to provide for the safeguards of taxpayer rights. 
S. 	 1077-A bill to amend the Act of December 22, 1974, to relocate cer­
tain members of the Navajo and Hopi tribes. 
S. 	 1187-A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code with regard 
to the appointment and compensation of counsel for jurors claiming a 
violation by their employers of certain rights guaranteed by such title. 
S. 	 1290--A bill to amend the Social Security Act to reform the program of 
aid to families with dependent children, to make improvements in the 
standards for eligibility and benefits in the program of supplemental se­
curity income and to provide for the improved administration of both 
programs, and to make related amendments to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954. 
S. 	1291-A bill to amend title 5 of the United States Code to improve the 
procedures for agency rule making, to require agencies to adhere to a 
pro-competition standard, to require the Congress and the President to 
review certain regulatory agencies, and to provide public participation 
funding. 
S. 	 1450--A bill to promote the foreign policy of the United States by 
strengthening and improving the Foreign Service of the United States. 
S. 	 1466-A bill to provide for the distribution of certain funds appropri­
ated to pay judgments in favor of the Delaware Tribe of Indians and 
the Absentee Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma in Indian Claims 
Commission dockets 27-A and 241, 289, and 27-B and 338. 
S. 	 170l-A bill to amend the Magnuson-Moss-Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act to extend the protections contained in such Act to 
owners of new passenger motor vehicles, and for other purposes. 
